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pel the executive to increase the funding allotment for the penal system.

To a large degree, the effectiveness of judicial intervention in the area
of prison reform is circumscribed by the courts' inability to marshall
financial commitments for that purpose. But the major difficulty confronting the courts and those who envision social rehabilitation as a
constitutional right lies in changing the public conceptualization of the
penal system. The eighth amendment can only reflect the normative
values of the American people.

The future of the eighth amendment

rests not so much with thoughtful jurists but rather with an informed
and concerned public.
RONALD

H. ROSENBERG

Constitutional Law-Evidence-Testimonial Reprieve for Newsmen in Civil Litigation
Until recently newsmen appeared to be fighting a losing battle to
obtain a privilege to withhold confidential sources and information in

legal proceedings.

By mid-1972 only eighteen states had statutes

granting an evidentiary privilege to newsmen,' and the Supreme Court
had decided in Branzburg v. Hayes' that newsmen enjoy no first

amendment right to withhold information from grand juries.

After

Branzburg, several newsmen who refused to divulge their sources were
held in contempt, and a few journalists3 were jailed. 4 Several news1. A. A. CODE tit. 7, § 370 (1960); ALAsKA STAT.

§§ 09.25.150, 09.25.160

(Supp. 1970); Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1970); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 43-917 (1964); CAL. EviD. CODE ANN. § 1070 (West, 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51,
§§ 111-19 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1733 (1968); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 45:1451-54 (Supp. 1970); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 35, § 2 (1971); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945(10) (1954); MoNT.
Rnv. CODES ANN. §§ 93-601 to -602 (1964); NEV. REv. STAT. § 49.275 (1969); N.J.

STAT. ANN. §§ 2A-84A-21,29 (Supp. 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1970);
N.Y. Civ. RiGnTs LAw § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1970); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §
2739.12 (Page 1953); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1970).
2. 408 U.S. 665 (1972), reporting the disposition of three cases: Branzburg v.
Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky.), cert. granted sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 402 U.S.
942 (1971); In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 614, 266 N.E.2d 297, cert. granted, 402 U.S.
942 (1971); and Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
granted, 402 U.S. 942 (1971).
3. Throughout this note, "journalist" appears interchangeably with the terms
"newsman" and "reporter." The term "newsman" encompasses persons involved in
all phases of journalism, including news reporting and editing. Whether a privilege
should extend also to college newspaper reporters and editors or to authors of current
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men still face subpoenas and possible imprisonment. 5 Yet despite
Branzburg, or perhaps in reaction against that decision, the tide seems
to have shifted in recent months. Federal, state, and local officials issued relatively fewer subpoenas in the latter part of 1972 and in the

beginning of 1973.8 Furthermore, approximately fifty-eight bills calling for some type of evidentiary privilege for newsmen have been in-

troduced in Congress during the current session. 7

Since Branzburg,

books, for example, is a hotly debated question. The extent of a reportorial privilege,
however, is an issue beyond the scope of this note.
4. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1973, at 38, col. 5; id., Feb. 22, 1973, at 10, col. 4.
Peter Bridge was held in contempt of court and jailed for 20 days for refusing to
disclose confidential information relating to a story about official corruption that appeared in the Newark Evening News; Edwin Goodwin received a 30-day sentence,
of which he served 44 hours, for refusing to deliver WBAI-FM tapes of a prison riot;
William Farr spent 46 days in jail for refusing to disclose his source for a Los Angeles
Times article about the Charles Manson murder trial. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16,
1972, at 60; TmE, Jan. 1, 1973, at 44; N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1973, at 46, cols. 5-7;
id., Feb. 8, 1973, at 19, col. 1.
John Lawrence, Washington bureau chief for the Los Angeles Times, was jailed
briefly (2 hours) after his initial refusal to release recordings of an interview with a
key figure in the Watergate bugging case. The contempt citation and the jail sentence
ended when the source of the interview agreed not to bind the Times to its promise of
confidentiality and when the newspaper consequently handed over the tapes to the
court. NEwswEEK, Jan. 1, 1973, at 58; TME, Jan. 1, 1973, at 44; N.Y. Times, Dec.
22, 1973, at 1, cols. 1-3.
5. Among these reporters are Caldwell, Pappas, and Branzburg. No effort has
yet been made to recall either Caldwell or Pappas before grand juries; but Branzburg is
under a state six-month contempt sentence and refuses to return to Kentucky. He currently works for the Detroit Free Press. Governor Wendell Ford of Kentucky has
moved to extradite him from Michigan. TImE, Oct. 16, 1972, at 44; Hume, A
Chilling Effect on the Press, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 79.
Other possible contempt proceedings confront South Carolina newsmen who were
subpoenaed to testify about a story on misconduct by officials and guardians at a
local detention center. Hume, supra at 82.
In Memphis, Tennessee, a reporter faces a contempt charge by a state legislative
subcommittee for refusing to disclose the source of an article about the abuses of a
state-operated home for retarded children. NEwSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1972, at 60; Hume,
supra at 82.
6. Tm NEw REPUBLic, Feb. 24, 1973, at 6.
7. S.J. Res. 8, S. 36, S. 158, S. 318, S. 451, S. 637, S. 750, S. 870, S. 917, S. 1128,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 717, H.R. 1263, H.R. 1735, H.R. 1794, H.R. 1813,
H.R. 1818, H.RIL 1819, H.R. 1985, H.R. 2002, H.R. 2015, H.R. 2101, H.R. 2187, H.R.
2200, H.R. 2230, H.R. 2231, H.RL 2232, H.R. 2233, H.R. 2234, H.R. 2433, H.R. 2563,
H.R. 2584, H.R. 2651, H.RL 3143, H.R. 3181, H.R. 3369, H.R. 3460, H.R. 3482,
3725, H.R. 3741, H.R. 3811, H.R. 3964, H.R. 3975,
H.R. 3520, H.R. 3595, HI.
H.R. 4020, H.R. 4035, H.R. 4135, H.R. 4275, H.R. 4383, H.R. 4423, H.R. 4456,
H.R. 4749, H.R. 5060, H.R. 5167, H.R. 5194, H.R1 5198, H.R. 5227, H.R. 5317, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
Bills range from those calling for absolute protection to those suggesting a
qualified newsman's privilege. Many bills list crimes involving foreign aggression or
threat to life as areas in which the newsman's immunity should not apply. A critical
point of difference is also whether or not Congress should pre-empt state laws on
newsmen's privilege. See, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1973, at 5, col. 1.
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two states have passed "shield" laws for newsmen,8 most of the remaining states are pressing for similar legislation, 9 and the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws are working on a model law to protect
10
newsmen.
Lower courts may also choose to limit the application of Branzburg, as demonstrated by the Second Circuit in Baker v. F & F Investment,1 1 which declined to extend the Branzburg rule to civil cases.
The court recognized a newsman's first amendment right to withhold
from discovery the identity of confidential news sources in limited circumstances. This note will examine Baker in the context of prior law
on testimonial privilege for newsmen and will weigh its significance as
one of the first circuit court decisions clearly to recognize a first amend12
ment claim to a reportorial privilege.
Unlike many reporters who have faced grand jury subpoenas,
journalist Alfred Balk in Baker faced demands for disclosure of confidential sources in civil litigation. In a federal class action plaintiffs,
Chicago blacks charged local realtors with discrimination in the sale
of housing.' 3 Several years before the Chicago suit, journalist Balk
had written an article on housing discrimination in Chicago entitled
"Confessions of a Block-Buster," which appeared in the Saturday Evening Post.'4 Information for the article was provided by a local realtor who agreed to describe Chicago "blockbusting" practices on the condition that his identity be kept secret. When Balk refused to reveal
the identity of the Chicago realtor in a deposition taken in New York,
plaintiffs moved for an order under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to compel discovery. A federal district court in New
York denied the motion,' 5 and plaintiffs appealed the order to the
Second Circuit.' 6
8. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1973); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 9-19.1-1
to -2 (1973).
9. N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1973, at 58, cols. 3-6.
10. Blasi, The Justice and the Journalist, THE NATION, Sept. 18, 1972, at 199.
11. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 2147 (1973).
12. Two other circuit courts have recognized a qualified privilege for newsmen:
Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972); Caldwell v. United States,
434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
13. Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment, Civil No. 69-15 (N.D. Ill.
filed 1969).
14. July 14-21, 1962, at 15.
15. Baker v. F &F Investment, 339 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
16. Generally, interlocutory appeals from discovery orders are not permitted,
see, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117 (1906); Borderm Co. v. Sylk, 410
F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1969); United States v. Fried, 386 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1967). Orders
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In a unanimous decision, the Second Circuit upheld the lbwer
court's order. While declining to find either New York or Illinois

"shield" laws 17 controlling in Baker, the court recognized the first
amendment interests in the public's receiving news and in the newsman's gathering news implicit in those laws and held those interests
controlling. The Second Circuit applied a conventional first amendment balancing approach, weighing the journalist's first amendment
right to disseminate and gather information and the public's need to
be informed against the plaintiffs' and the public's interest in compelling testimony in judicial proceedings. The court found no "overriding and compelling interest" to which the first amendment interests
8
must yield.
The Second Circuit distinguished Branzburg since it was confined
to grand jury investigations of criminal activity.' 9 The court in Baker
compelling discovery in a district other than the district in which the main action is
brought are ordinarily non-appealable interlocutory decisions, see, e.g., National Nut
Co. v. Kelling Nut Co., 134 F.2d 532 (7th Cir. 1943). An order denying discovery
in an "outside" jurisdiction, however, is immediately reviewable. Republic Gear Co.
v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1967). See also Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 780 (2d Cir. 1972); 9 J.MooRE, FEDERAL PRACMcE 1 110.13[2],
at 157 (2d ed. 1973).
17. N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKmney Supp. 1972) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any general or specific law to the contrary, no professional journalist or newscaster employed or otherwise associated with any newspaper, magazine, news agency, press association, wire
service, radio or television transmission station or network, shall be adjudged
in contempt by any court, the legislature or other body having contempt
powers, for refusing or failing to disclose any news or the source of any such
news coming into his possession in the course of gathering or obtaining news
for publication or to be published in a newspaper, magazine, or for broadcast
by a radio or television transmission station or network, by which he is professionally employed or otherwise associated in a news gathering capacity. . . .
ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 51, §§ 111-19 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972) provide for a
privilege only to withhold disclosure of confidential sources. Section 111 states:
"No court may compel any person to disclose the source of any information obtained
by a reporter during the course of his employment except as provided in this Act."
Further limitations restrict the privilege. Section 111 provides: "The privilege
conferred by this Act is not available in any libel or slander action in which a reporter or news medium is a party defendant." Section 117 provides that the court
may divest the privilege if it finds:
(a) that the information sought does not concern matters, or details in
any proceeding, required to be kept secret under the laws of this State or of
the Federal government; and
(b) that all other available sources of information have been exhausted
and disclosure of the information sought is essential to the protection of the
public interest involved.
18. 470 F.2d at 783.
19. The Supreme Court stated in Branzburg: "The sole issue before us is the
obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to
answer questions relevant to an investigation into the commission of crime." 408
U.S. at 682.
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emphasized that "[n]o such criminal overtones color the facts in this
civil case. '' 20 The Second Circuit also declined to follow Garland v.
Torre,21 the leading civil case concerning a journalist's first amendment claim to testimonial privilege. Garland had rejected the reporter's first amendment argument, but the Baker court contended that the
case was distinguishable since the plaintiff in Garland had taken unsuccessful independent action to discover the identity of the defendant's
source and the identity of the source was essential to the plaintiff's
suit. In the Baker fact situation, persons other than Balk might have
disclosed the identity of the source, yet the plaintiffs made no attempt
to exhaust this possibility. Furthermore, the court asserted that the
identity of Balk's source did not go to the heart of the case. Also,
22
Balk was not a party to the underlying action.
The ease with which the Second Circuit distinguished Baker from
Branzburg and Garland and the court's facility in finding a basis in
the first amendment for Balk's refusal to disclose his source should not
mask the truly innovative approach of the Baker court. The court's
finding first amendment grounds for reportorial "privilege" appears unusual in light of prior development of the law in this area.
The common-law rule recognizes no evidentiary privilege for
newsmen similar to that enjoyed by physicians and attorneys in their
professional capacities. 23 Thus, newsmen may be compelled to reveal
information given to them in confidence and to disclose the identity of
confidential sources. This rule is uniformly observed in all types of
legal proceedings: grand jury investigations, 24 judicial investigations relating to grand jury proceedings, 25 criminal trials, 20 legislative investigations,"7 and civil litigation.28 Generally, courts have been unreceptive to the newsman's argument that an evidentiary privilege is essential to the maintenance of the journalist's livelihood,20 although courts
20. 470 F.2d at 784.
21. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
22. 470 F.2d at 783-84.
23. See Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 591 (1966).
24. Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1950) (en bane); In re Grunow, 84
NJ.L. 235, 85 A. 1011 (1913); People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199
N.E. 415 (1936); People ex rel. Phelps v. Fancher, 2 Hun 226 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874).
25. Joslyn v. People, 67 Colo. 297, 184 P. 375 (1919).
26. People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 48 P. 75 (1897); Plunkett v. Hamilton,
136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911); Pledger v. State, 77 Ga. 242, 3 S.E. 320 (1887); of.
Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
27. Ex parte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124 (1897) (per curiam).
28. Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957).
29. See, e.g., Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911).
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regularly exclude relevant evidence as a method of protecting other
confidential relationships (husband-wife, attorney-client, physician-patient, and informer-police). 30 Likewise, the Proposed Federal Rules
1
of Evidence include no newsmen's privilege.3
Many cases that rely on the common-law rule give no reason

for its application.3 2 When a reason is given, the most frequent explanation for the rule denying a newsman's privilege is the superior

interest of the public in compelling testimony over any private considerations that exist between newsmen and their sources. 83 The courts
often cite Wigmore, who disfavors privileges as "so many derogations

from a positive general rule [that everyone is obligated to testify when
properly summoned]" and as "obstacle[s] to the administration of justice."3 4
Only twenty states so far have legislated evidentiary privileges for

newsmen,35 in derogation of the common-law rule. Even where statutes exist, however, journalists receive little protection, since many of
these laws provide heavily qualified privileges.3 " Furthermore, "shield"
30. See, e.g., People ex rel Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415
(1936).
31. PRoPosED FED. R. Evm. (although the Supreme Court approved the new Federal Rules of Evidence on November 20, 1972, to become effective July 1, 1973, the
Rules are still "Proposed" because Congress passed legislation which requires express
Congressional approval before the Rules can become effective. Act of March 30,
1970, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. At the time of this writing, Congress had not
yet approved the Rules).
32. Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D.Mass. 1957);
People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 48 P. 75 (1897); Pledger v. State, 77 Ga. 242, 3
S.E. 320 (1887).
33. See, e.g., Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 83, 70 S.E. 781, 786 (1971);
People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 295, 199 N.E. 415, 416 (1936).
34. 8 1. WiGMoRB, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 70, 73 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
35. See jurisdictions cited in notes 1 and 8 supra.
36. ALAsKA STAT. §§ 09.25.160 (Supp. 1970) requires disclosure of sources if the
withholding of testimony would result in a "miscarriage of justice" or is "contrary to
the public interest." In Arkansas, under ARn. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964), the
newsman must disclose his source if his article containing confidential information was
published "in bad faith, with malice, and not in the interest of the public welfare."
In Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 111-19 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972) withdraws the
newsman's privilege in libel and slander actions in which the newsman is a party defendant and may require disclosure of confidential sources if "the information sought
does not concern matters. . . required to be kept secret" under state or federal law or
if "all other available sources of information have been exhausted and disclosure .. .
is essential to the protection of the public interest involved." In Louisiana, LA. RLv.
STAT. §§ 45:1451-54 (Supp. 1970) requires disclosure of confidential sources when
"essential to the public interest." In New Mexico, under N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-112.1 (Supp. 1970) disclosure of sources is required when "essential to prevent injustice."
In six states the newsman enjoys a privilege to withhold his source only after
publication of an article baed on confidential iformation. See ALA. CODE tit. 7,
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laws in derogation of the common law are strictly construed; courts
that have interpreted existing statutes have frequently denied the privilege altogether. Strict construction of newsmen's statutory privileges
has been the rule in both criminal proceedings 7 and civil litigation3 8
In only a limited number of cases has the journalist been successful.80
The present uncertainty as to the applicability of state law in federal
courts poses another hazard to the journalist if the question of statutory
privilege arises in federal question cases. Baker, for example, chose
to ignore both the "shield" laws of Illinois (the forum state) and New
York (the state where Balk's deposition was taken).4 °
The first amendment claim to a newsman's privilege was presented initially in Garland v. Torre,41 a civil action in which actress
Judy Garland brought suit against newspaper columnist Marie Torre
§ 370 (1960); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1970); CAL. EVI. CODE
ANN. § 1070 (West 1966); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (1969); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 35, § 2 (1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A-84A-21, -29 (Supp. 1969).
Three states protect confidential communications received from sources, see MICH.
(1954); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAw § 79-h (McKinney Supp.
1970); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1970). Other states which permit the
newsman to withhold the identity of sources require disclosure of confidential communications.
37. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478,
30 A.2d 421 (1943).
California's statute was strictly construed in the case of William Farr, when the
court held the statute inapplicable. See note 4 supra. Peter Bridge was cited for
contempt and jailed despite the New Jersey statutory privilege for newsmen. In re
Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1500 (1973).
38. In re Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (Cal. statute); Deltec, Inc.
v. Dun. & Bradstreet, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ohio 1960) (Ohio statute); Brogan
v. Passaic Daily News, 22 NJ. 139, 123 A.2d 473 (1956); Beecroft v. Point Pleasant
Printing & Publishing Co., 82 NJ. Super. 269, 197 A.2d 416 (1964).
39. Ex parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351, (N.D. Ala. 1953) (libel action, Alabama statute); In re Howard, 136 Cal. App. 2d 816, 289 P.2d 537 (1955) (labor dispute); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963) (grand jury investigation).
40. In deciding whether to apply the federal or state law on privilege, the rule is
clear in cases arising in federal courts under diversity jurisdiction: state law is determinative, see Cervantes v. Time Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 989 (8th Cir. 1972). Courts
are divided, however, as to the obligation of federal courts to follow state privilege
rules when the underlying action arises in federal question cases. See Annot., 95
A.L.R.2d 320 (1964); Comment, Evidentiary Privileges in the Federal Courts, 52 CAL.
L Rv. 640 (1964). Although the Second Circuit in Baker held state law nondetermin.
ative, the Ninth Circuit ruled in Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960), that
if state laws of privilege are regarded as not mere rules of evidence but as substantive
rights, the Erie principle should apply and state law should be followed even in federal
question cases. In the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 501, however, the
Advisory Committee's note indicates that federal law will henceforth control in cases
arising under federal question jurisdiction, i.e., newsmen will enjoy no evidentiary
privilege.
41. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).
STAT. ANN. § 28-945(1)
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for publishing defamatory remarks allegedly made by CBS officials.
The plaintiff moved to compel Miss Torre to reveal the source of the
alleged statements, but the columnist refused on the grounds that disclosure of confidential news sources would encroach upon freedom of
the press. Miss Torre contended "it would impose an important practical restraint on the flow of news from news sources to news media
and would thus diminish pro tanto the flow of news to the public."4
In dictum the court accepted the journalist's argument that compulsory
disclosure of confidential news sources may entail an abridgement of
press freedom. Nevertheless, the court rejected Miss Torre's claim to
privilege in holding that first amendment considerations were not absolute and would yield under the Constitution "to a paramount public
interest in the fair administration of justice."43 The Garland rule,
which has since become the majority view, resurfaced in two other civil
cases: In re Goodfader4 and Adams v. Associated Press.4 5 In both
cases the courts emphasized the importance of compulsory testimony
as opposed to first amendment interests in nondisclosure.
At least seven decisions involving grand jury investigations have
echoed similar rejections of a newsman's first amendment privilege, 46
the most important of which was the Supreme Court's ruling in Branzburg. Although journalists in these cases argued for a privilege based
on the public's right to the news, the news editor in State v. Buchanan,4 7
as well as reporters Branzburg, Pappas, and Caldwell, claimed a privilege also grounded on a newsman's right to gather news. 48 In rejecting this claim, the Buchanan court stated that a newsman has no constitutional right to information that is not accessible to the public generally and that granting special privileges to newsmen would violate
notions of equal protection. 49 The Supreme Court reiterated this view
42. Id. at 547-48. The argument that the first amendment exists to preserve an
"untrammeled press as a vital source of public information" has received Supreme
Court approval, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936); cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
43. 259 F.2d at 549.
44. 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961).
45. 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
46. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d
345 (Ky. 1971); In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 614, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971); In re Bridge,
120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (1972); State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d
729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963);
State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971).
47. 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (1968).
48. Id. at 247, 436 P.2d at 730.
49. Id. at 247-49, 436 P.2d at 731.
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in Branzburg.5° In rejecting newsmen's alternative first amendment
claims based on the public's right to news, the courts either placed a
higher value on the public's "right to everyman's evidence" 1 than on
the public's "need to know" or considered the relationship between
of news sources and the gathering of news excessively
the protection
52
tenuous.
Prior to Baker, few decisions had granted newsmen a qualified
right to withhold information. 3 Among those decisions, the opinion
of the Ninth Circuit in Caldwell v. United States"4 was subsequently
overturned by the Supreme Court. Two civil libel cases, Alioto v.
Cowles Communications, Inc.55 and Cervantes v. Time, Inc.,sc although they affirmed reporters' first amendment claims of privilege, in57
volved issues different than those that the Baker court confronted;
neither could serve as exact precedent to Baker.
In giving effect to qualified constitutional privilege, Baker seems
to be a clear departure from the mainstream of law. Yet this case appears in some aspects to follow Branzburg and Garland. Although
the Branzburg rule was strictly confined to grand jury investigations,
the Supreme Court indicated that in general only "compelling" or
"paramount" interests would override first amendment rights.58 Similarly, Garland asserted that "compulsory disclosure of a journalist's
confidential sources of information may entail an abridgment of press
freedom '"59 and that any infringement of first amendment rights would
be justified only in view of an overriding public interest in compelling
testimony. 60 The court in Baker could have easily reached its decision
50. 408 U.S. at 684.
51. See note 34 supra.
52. See, e.g., 408 U.S. at 693-94.
53. Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972); Caldwell v. United
States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970); Air Transport Ass'n v. Professional Air Traffic
Controllers Organization, Crim. Nos. 70-400, -410 (E.D.N.Y. April 6, 1970 at 21,
38-39, 149-50) cited in Comment, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional
Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 318 n.7 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Reporters]; Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., C.A. 52150 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 4, 1969 at 165-67) cited in Reporters 318 n.7; People v. Dohrn, Crim. No. 693808 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Ill. May 20, 1970) cited in Reporters 313 n.7; People v.
Rios, No. 75129 (Super. Ct. San Francisco Cty. 1970) cited in Reporters 318 n.7.
54. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
55. C.A. 52150 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 1969 at 165-67) cited in Reporters 318 n.7.
56. 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972).
57. See text accompanying notes 86 and 87 infra.
58. 408 U.S. at 700.
59. 259 F.2d at 548.
60. Id.
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within the framework of Justice Powell's concurring and controlling
opinion in Branzburg,6 1 which asserted the legitimacy of resisting demands that bear only a "remote and tenuous relationship to the subject
of the investigation ..
*"62
The identity of Balk's news source was
tangential to the thrust of the Baker plaintiffs' complaint. The necessity for disclosing the confidential source was in no way "compelling"
or "paramount." In fact, it paled in significance to the importance
of unearthing information for grand jury investigations. According
to this view, Baker reached a different result because it was factually
distinguishable from. Branzburg. The same conclusion may apply in
comparing Baker to Garland. The court in Baker apparently accepted
the view expressed in Garland that when disclosure of a newsman's
confidential sources goes "to the heart of the. . . claim" a compelling
need may be found sufficient to override first amendment interests. 3
The court may have affirmed the newsman's position because the identity of the news source "simply did not go to the heart of appellants'
case ...

""

Nevertheless, the congruence between Baker on the one hand, and
Branzburg and Garland on the other, is superficial and should not mask
the real disparity between Baker's language and approach and that of
Branzburg or Garland. The court in Baker recognized what Branzburg and Garland accepted only as an hypothesis: "[c]ompelled disclosure of confidential sources unquestionably threatens a journalist's
ability to secure information that is made available to him only on a
confidential basis."6 5 Garland postulated only an "hypothesis that
compulsory disclosure of a journalist's confidential sources of information may entail an abridgment of press freedom by imposing some
limitation upon the availability of news."6 6 The Second Circuit at the
time of the Garland decision was unconvinced that first amendment
interests were involved. So was the Supreme Court in deciding Branzburg. It asserted that its decision in no way threatened the vast bulk
of confidential relationships between reporters and their sources 67 and
61. 408 U.S. at 709-10. Since the Court was split five to four in its decision,
Powell as the fifth and pivotal member of the majority carried, in his concurring
opinion, the controlling view.
62. Id. at 710.
63. 470 F.2d at 783-84.
64. Id. at 783.
65. Id. at 782 (emphasis added).
66. 259 F.2d at 548 (emphasis added).
67. 408 U.S. at 691.
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contended that the existing rules denying a newsman's privilege "have
not been a serious obstacle to either the development or retention of
confidential news sources by the press."0 8 The Court ruled that the
burden on news gathering that results from forced disclosures was at
best uncertain.6 9
Baker went one step further than Garland or Branzburg by reaffirming the Buchanan claim that the press, independent of the public's
right to information, has a constitutional right to gather news. 7" Gdrland had refused to elevate the press's interest beyond a mere private
stake in withholding news, and Branzburg flatly rejected the notion
of a newsman's right to gather news. 71 Baker further transformed the
terms in the balancing analysis by relabelling the interests involved in
civil litigation. Garland had asserted that the balancing test in civil
actions pitted a public interest in compelled testimony against a newsman's private interest in withholding information. 7z Baker, on the
other hand, alluded to the "public and private interests" in nondis78
closure rivalling the litigants' "private interest" in compelled disclosure.
Baker not only transformed the terms of the balancing equation
but also modified the weight given those terms. Whereas Garland
and Branzburg emphasized the "paramount public interest in the fair
administration of justice, ' 74 Baker stressed the preferred position of
the first amendment.7 5 Underlining the "paramount public interest in
' 70
the maintenance of a vigorous, aggressive and independent press,
Baker asserted that only in "rare" cases, "few in number," will first
amendment rights yield to competing interests.7
The contrary presumption prevails in both Branzburg and Garland.
68. Id. at 699.
69. Id. at 693.
70. 470 F.2d at 782.
71. "It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the
press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public
generally." 408 U.S. at 684. If the Court's statement is a rejection of the newsman's
private claim as a balancing test factor in all legal proceedings, the Second Circuit may
have exceeded its jurisdiction by violating the Supreme Court's dictum. If, on the
other hand, one accepts literally the Supreme Court's assertion that its opinion in
Branzburg was strictly confined to grand jury proceedings, Baker may easily be distinguished from Branzburg. Baker may be viewed as recognizing a newsman's private
first amendment interest in the context of civil litigation only.
72. 259 F.2d at 549.
73. 470 F.2d at 782, 785.
74. 259 F.2d at 549.
75. 470 F.2d at 783.
76. Id. at 782.
77. Id. at 783.
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Most significantly, Baker demonstrates the potential of lower
courts to limit Branzburg by refusing to apply its rule outside grand
jury proceedings. Lower courts seeking to overcome the Supreme
Court's ruling may do so not only because the Court confined its decision strictly to grand jury investigations, 7 but also because the first
amendment balancing equation varies significantly with the legal context in which the newsman's claim is presented. The argument for
a newsman's testimonial privilege has been asserted generally in five
basic types of legal proceedings: (1) grand jury investigations, (2)
criminal trials, (3) civil litigation, not including defamatory actions,
(4) civil defamatory litigation, and (5) legislative hearings. Although
the balance of interests that determines the success of a newsman's
first amendment claim is decided on a case-by-case basis, 79 the character of the proceedings in which the claim is asserted will be a major
determinant in the balancing test. Under that test, the claims on the
newsman's side-the public's right to information and the newsman's
interest in gathering news-are constant, independent of the nature of
the legal proceedings. The interests on the opposite side of the scales
vary, however, with the nature of the legal context.
In grand jury investigations the obligation to appear and testify
is especially strong and the scope of permissible inquiry is broad."
The Supreme Court noted in Branzburg that the scope of inquiry is
necessarily far-reaching because the task of the grand jury "is to inquire
into the existence of possible criminal conduct and to return only wellfounded indictments.
...
"81 Grand jury investigations, it observed,
are "constitutionally mandated for the institution of federal criminal
prosecutions for capital or other serious crimes," ' and "[t]he adoption
of the grand jury 'in our Constitution as the sole method for preferring
charges in serious criminal cases shows the high place it held as an instrument of justice.' ,,83
In criminal trials since the prosecution's interest in compelling testimony approximates that of the prosecution in grand jury investigations, one may speculate that the scales will generally be weighted
against the newsman. Another factor weighing against the newsman's
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

408 U.S. at 682.
Id. at 710 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
Id. at 688.
Id.
Id. at 687.
Id., quoting Costello v,United States, 350 U.S, 359, 362 (1956).
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first amendment claim is that the defendant in criminal cases has a
constitutional right ". . . to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor. .... ,,84
In civil litigation the newsman stands a far greater chance of successfully arguing a constitutional testimonial privilege than in grand
jury investigations or criminal trials. He may rely on the Supreme
Court's assertion of the superior status of the grand jury in distinguishing his case. Also, in civil litigation, unlike grand jury investigations and criminal trials, the interest in compelling testimony is exclusively that of a private litigant.8 5 Pitted against the newsman's argument in favor of a public right to nondisclosure, the private litigant
in civil litigation may have difficulty in compelling confidential information from newsmen.
In civil defamatory action, however, the outcome of the balancing test is less clear. On one hand, recognition of a newsman's privilege in defamatory actions could destroy libel actions against news
media. Plaintiffs are required to prove that news-defendants acted
with "reckless disregard of the truth,"8' 6 a difficult requirement if newsmen can hide behind anonymous sources. On the other hand, if
newsmen are denied a testimonial privilege in defamatory actions, the
danger exists that public figures could get access to reporters' sources
87
merely by filing libel suits.
In legislative hearings the newsman must overcome a tradition of
broad legislative investigatory powers, but he may point to the Court's
assertion in Branzburg of the superior status of the grand jury in distinguishing his case. The newsman may also rely on a few cases that
suggest first amendment limitations on legislative powers to investi88
gate.
Baker leaves at least two critical questions unanswered. First,
should a qualified privilege for newsmen vary with the nature of the
news reported? Arguably, the courts should grant greater protection
84. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
85. Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d at 783, 785.
86. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
87. See Blasi, The Justice and the Journalist,THm NATION, Sept. 18, 1972; Hume,
A Chilling Effect on the Press, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1972, § 6 (Magazine) at 82;
id., Feb. 22, 1973, at 10, cols. 4-5.
88. See, e.g., DeGregory v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825 (1966); Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178 (1957) (dictum); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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to coverage of governmental misconduct, civil corruption, foreign aggression, and serious crimes, rather than to gossip items or articles
covering the private lives of public figures, for example. On the other
hand, this type of distinction could engage the judiciary in a dangerous
arbitration of what news the public needs to know. Secondly, how
can Baker's qualified privilege approach, which relies on such incalculable contingencies as whether the information sought "goes to the
heart of . . . the case," whether the identity of the news source will
be demanded in a civil trial or a grand jury investigation, or whether
the party seeking confidential information will have recourse to another available source, help the newsman at the critical moment when
the source is approached? Unless the newsman, who cannot know
the answer to such variables prior to ligitation, is able to guarantee
confidentiality, his source may refuse to talk.
Despite its shortcomings, Baker represents a judicial giant-step toward recognition that a newsman's privilege is today necessary to protect the free flow of information to the public. Events subsequent to
Branzburg have shown that the Supreme Court's ruling has had a
chilling effect on the press,8 9 retarding precisely that type of reflective
and socially relevant news coverage that the Second Circuit sought to
protect in Baker. Hopefully, the Baker decision will serve as a model
to lower courts in limiting Branzburg's application and as a guide to
federal and state legislatures in drawing up statutory privileges for
newsmen. In the growing number of civil actions in which private
litigants demand disclosure of confidential news sources, 90 Baker will
have its greatest impact as precedent.
It would be misleading, however, to exaggerate Baker's importance, since the question of privilege depends greatly on the factual
nuances of each case. Uncertainty in the area of a constitutional testimonal privilege for newsmen outside grand jury investigations awaits
resolution by the Supreme Court.
DIANA CARTER PRADKA
89. See generally, Hume, A Chilling Effect on the Press, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17,
1972), § 6 (Magazine), at 13.
Reporter Earl Caldwell has stated, for example: "From now on no newspaper can
hope to cover effectively an organization such as the Panthers. I don't care how black.
a reporter is, he won't get close. He won't and he shouldn't try. He won't because
he cannot be trusted as a reporter." Ask me, I Know. I was the Test Case, SATUDAY
R vmw, Aug. 5, 1972, at 5.
90. Blasi, Privilege in a Time of Violence, Tun NATION, Dec. 21, 1970, at 655,

